Anthropologists and economists commonly employ opposing self-stereotypes to characterize their respective perspectives: concern with relations and processes versus the distribution of outcomes, with contextual understanding versus selective explanation; constructionist versus positivist epistemologies, inductive versus deductive research designs, participant observation versus regressions on existing data sets, and imaginary worlds populated by culturally situated groups versus rational economic maximizing individuals (Appadurai 1989; Ray, in this issue). These contrasts set the stage for conversations between anthropologists and economists. This article describes a research journey in terms of one such imaginary conversation. It concerns work on collective action and common-property resources that I have conducted as an anthropologist close to the frontier with economics. Almost by definition, boundaries are places where differences are expressed, sometimes exaggerated. My argument here is that the understanding and explication of disciplinary difference can be more productive than boundary crossing, blurring, or the attempt to create a unified conceptual field. To illustrate the latter point, I will consider the case of an idea of "social capital" that its proponents claim is able, at one and the same time, to describe the relational dimension of social life and to produce aggregable data that can be subject to regression analyses that isolate "the social" as a variable at macro (e.g., national) levels. Social capital, I will suggest, is a conversation stopper.
center stage in international development. The renewed interest in decentralization, resources management transfer (RMT), and community-driven development (CDD) focuses attention again on "local-level" institutions and collective action. Of course, governmental interest in local institutions and efforts to discover, formalize, enforce, or protect "traditional" community institutions are nothing new. Almost every region of the world that experienced colonial rule had some form of "government through community" (Li 2002 ; see Mosse 1999) , and nationalist movements and postcolonial states discovered and molded community institutions in the image of their own modes of government (Rao 2005) . The same is the case with more recent neoliberal forms of governance.
Community institutions have been idealized, homogenized, and traditionalized, but they are also the object of interventions in which they are upgraded, democratized, or modernized so as to meet new demands and fit within contemporary policy objectives. Community institutions are good vehicles for development intervention because, on the one hand, they demonstrate society as "naturally" self-regulating-an important premise of neoliberal political economy-and, on the other hand, they offer opportunities for improvement (Li 2002, 2) . Furthermore, by generating new demand for transparency and bureaucratic accountability, community institutions provide a means to reform local-level governance from the bottom up.
Because representations of community so readily comply with external visions or administrative exigencies, whether colonial, nationalist, or neoliberal, it is easy to project policy preoccupations into community spaces. This article aims to show how awkward community institutions and local social processes can be in reality, how they confound the models and modes of analysis that dominate within donor agencies such as the World Bank. This is an anthropological view. Indeed, this article is a conversation between an anthropologist and the theories of local institutions more prevalent in donor analyses: first, institutional economics, and, second, social capital.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I will look at some evidence on variation in levels of collective action around common-property resources management in a south Indian region and assess different modes of explanation of this variation-institutional-economic and sociohistorical). Second, I will look at the implications of the analysis of "traditional" community institutions for the promotion of collective action through RMT and CDD interventions. Third, I will look at a certain conception of "social capital" as an analytical lens through which to view, interpret, and change local-level institutions. Two caveats are in order. First, in engaging anthropologically with economic modes of thinking about social relations, I do not discount the fact that some econ-omists themselves are now among the critics of conventional restrictive economic models of human action. The issue of coordination and collective action, in particular, has prompted new theoretical work drawing attention to public rituals generating "common knowledge" or "symbolic public goods" to explain how rational maximizing individuals solve "problems" of coordination (Chwe 2001; Rao 2005) . But, as will become clear, this does not mean that economists now seek the same kind of explanations or interpretations that anthropologists seek.
1 Second, in drawing attention to the limitations of the concept of "social capital" (premised on a false sense of common ground), my attention is on the economistic treatment of "the social," not the sociological use of the metaphor of capital. Hence, I will take the World Bank development of Robert Putnam's theory as a case rather than the work of sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu.
I. Variation in Collective Action in a South Indian Tank Irrigation System
In the mid-1990s, I undertook research in the southeastern Tamil plains region of India (the districts of Ramnad and Sivaganga) on the nature of collective action around water common property. The focus was an extensive and ancient tank irrigation system developed from around the sixteenth century in which tens of thousands of interconnected reservoirs capture, store, and use surface flow (see Mosse 2003) . As an anthropologist-historian, I was interested in the social organization, cultural logic, and politics of water common property. I believed that water and irrigation-something fundamental to social life but long confined to the economic domain as an input in production-needed to be treated as an institutional whole in a way that confounded the dualistic separation of economic-political and religious-cultural spheres (see Appadurai 1981) . My interest was in relationships and processes, but I was also concerned with outcomes and their distribution. Together with my old friend and field assistant M. Sivan, I began research in two villages with very different practices of water acquisition, distribution, rationing, maintenance, and repair, yet both 1 Closer to the concerns of contemporary anthropologists might be Debraj Ray's (2004, 1; also see Appadurai 2004 ) development of the notion of "aspiration," in that the starting point is the "social grounding of individual desires" rather than the economic rationality (or function) of "culture." Chwe (2001) , of course, also argues that human actions are interdependent and thus social, dependent upon mutual knowledge (a social relationship). He makes a functionalist case for the sociological a priori that humans are social, that human choices and strategizing are mediated by institutions (concepts, meanings, and values) and by shared assumptions about such things as justice, fairness, and reciprocity, which are constituted in culturally and historically specific ways (Douglas 1987 ). But we might go on to ask, how does common knowledge encourage coordination? When does it fail to, and why? Or, as concerns me here, how can we account for the appearance or disappearance of "rational rituals"? having irrigation tanks that were part of highly complex systems that were largely community rather than state operated.
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One village, Vayalur, was strikingly cooperative. Its water management system was well adapted to scarcity. Villagers acted collectively to ensure the water supply, diverting water from rivers, negotiating with upstream villages, and clearing channels. They agreed upon season-specific rules of water allocation (an area-based rationing calibrated to degrees of shortage, with strict preservation of water for subsistence rice cultivation on "wet land"). They had a system of distribution by water specialists, or nirppaccis, who undertook irrigation on the basis of detailed knowledge of the needs of individual wetland fields, thus mitigating the usual tension between head-and tail-enders. In the other, also water-scarce, village, Alapuram, by contrast, there was no collective decision making, and there were no formal rules of water allocation and distribution, no means to ration in times of shortage, no specialist irrigators, no means to prevent the diversion of water to dry-land cash crops or the unruly use of diesel pumps and pipes that bypassed damaged sluices and emptied the tank with remarkable speed. I began to ask questions more typical of an economist, namely, why did farmers in some villages cooperate to manage scarce resources while in other villages apparently crucial productive resources were neglected? How could intervillage variation in outcomes (degrees of collective action) be explained?
3 Pursuing this question, Sivan and I began to travel further and further afield, following water flows and finding out about water-control institutions and practices in more and more tanks and villages. Eventually our semi-structured survey, carried out through interviews, observation, and repeat visits, covered 89 interconnected tanks in 79 villages, by which time we had exhausted ourselves and our worn-out TVS moped.
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II. An Economic-Institutional View What was the pattern of variation, and how was it to be explained? To answer this question, I began by taking clues from research that was framed explicitly in economic terms and that offered to make sense of a broad pattern that was emerging. The tanks/villages that we had surveyed stretched across the upper 2 Sivan was a member of one of these villages, and I had undertaken research in the locality intermittently from 1982, working in one village for nearly 2 years overall. 3 The things that I was comparing (and taking as indicators of the strength of collective action) were, inter alia, the presence (and nature) of rules to allocate water in times of scarcity, specialist water turners and channel guards, and restrictions on the use of pumps. 4 We had not matched our economist questions with a research budget and a team of surveyors but insisted on that individualist and idiosyncratic relationship between researcher and data that characterizes anthropological practice. and lower parts of one minor river basin (with a total of over 2,000 tanks). In particular, they crossed a fairly sharp ecological divide marked by different soil and drainage characteristics. This corresponded to a sharp distinction in the degree of collective action around water use. The 57 villages that were surveyed in the predominantly sand soil upper catchment of the river basin were "cooperative"; they possessed institutions of water control and rationing, had specialist water turners, and in other ways shared characteristics with Vayalur. However, in the 22 villages that were surveyed in the black-soil lower catchment, as in Alapuram, these institutions of water control were wholly absent (see Mosse [2003] for details).
On the face of it, the ecology of tank-irrigated cultivation was a crucial factor and prevailing institutional economic explanations of variation in degrees of collective action in terms of risk and individual incentives made perfect sense. Simply put, on porous upper-catchment red soils, rice cultivation depended entirely on water captured in tanks. There was a high premium on maintaining sophisticated systems of water control. However, farmers could manage without these on the water-retentive black soils of the lower catchment, where tanks were less critical because a more diverse cultivation pattern combined irrigated rice with rainfed cropping (of, inter alia, chilies and rice). These findings bore a striking resemblance to Robert Wade's well-known study (1987) , which was similarly concerned with variation in institutions of collective action (across a catchment in Andhra Pradesh); Wade explained such variations in terms of ecologically determined factors of risk and scarcity. Our findings appeared to confirm the general proposition that collective action was shaped by a structure of payoffs arising from ecologically determined costs, benefits, and risks. In the upper-catchment area, ecological conditions are such that both the benefits from sustaining rules for cooperative water use and the costs of not cooperating (in terms of crop loss and social conflict) were high; that is, the private costs from unregulated behavior exceed the costs of cooperation. In the other (black-soil) area, the overall risks and the benefits of cooperation are low, land interests are dispersed, and cultivation practices are "individualized." 5 5 As Esha Shah (in personal communication) has pointed out, "ecologically determined scarcity" itself should be taken as shorthand for a rather more complex relationship between ecology, technology, and society. As a relationship between supply and demand, scarcity is technologically and politically, rather than ecologically, determined. "Scarcity-prone" upper-catchment villages are actually better endowed with water, being supplied with a denser network of tanks with greater storage capacity for a given area (a function of morphology) as compared to lower-catchment villages. Scarcity is generated by agricultural technology as well as wider political-economic factors that have shaped river basin development in the region.
This "conversation" with institutional economics had provided a fruitful line of enquiry and promised a convincing explanation for an overall pattern of variation in outcomes (i.e., collective action) and a conception of collective action in terms of incentives and sets of rules that both allowed generalizability and offered a mechanism for policy to be put into practice (Ostrom 1990; see Agrawal, forthcoming) . Had I been an economist, I would no doubt have wanted to refine this finding, to define the terms more precisely, to find a statistical method to isolate ecologically determined risk and scarcity, and to relate this case to a model that would be generalizable. Such a model might view cooperative institutions as the equilibrium outcome from competitive games shaped by the structure of individual incentives (costs and benefits) (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) .
6 I might even, following Chwe (2001) , try to model, game-theoretically, the processes and public rituals of "common knowledge" generation as the precondition for the successful operation of collective action rules, sanctions, or norms.
III. An Anthropological Perspective
As an anthropologist, however, I had other preoccupations and other points of departure, not least of which was an interest in social power. In my view, the economic models overlooked two important things associated with successful collective action around water in Vayalur and other upper-catchment villages. The first was the presence of strong structures of caste authority, and the second was the cultural construction of irrigation systems (their rules, roles, and transactions) as public institutions through which this authority was enacted. Could insights into collective action be gained by asking not about the economic (or communicative) conditions of cooperation but rather about the role of water control (including its public rituals) in expressing or reproducing relations of power and authority? My point was that the historically shaped and regionally specific institutions through which relations of power were reproduced in rural south India had to do with the control of water. And the way in which water control was institutionalized could be subject to comparative historical and ethnographic research.
Indeed, I found that, in different Tamil regions, water-use rights and rules were tied to social privilege and the rank of dominant caste and kin groups in different ways. For instance, in the northern Tamil districts, characterized historically by landholding collectives of the dominant caste (termed mirasi 6 Of course, as Agrawal (forthcoming) points out, the functionalist evolutionary logic of equilibrium outcomes is only one tradition among institutionalists. More recent work emphasizes the importance of political actors intervening to bring about change perceived as advantageous.
by the British), rights in tanks remained as vestiges of extensive share-based property control, still today fused with privileged rights or shares (pankus) in other public institutions, especially temples (see, e.g., Mosse 2003, 276ff.) . Then, in areas such as Pudukkottai, where resource control rested on the clan institutions of the ruling Kallar caste, rights to tank water and temple honors are articulated in the idiom of ranked lineages, or karai, which attach to social groups, not to land, and so cannot be sold (Dirks 1987, 210-12; Krishnan and Mohanaraja 1995, 225) . 7 In the southern Tamil districts (Sivaganga and Ramnad), by contrast, village-level systems of irrigation control are shaped, not by kin or caste-based rules of allocation, but by vertical relationships of control and dependence between hereditary headmen and Dalit caste water turners and channel watchers.
8 This is a region where localized Maravar warrior polities (nadus) were forged from the seventeenth century through extending and interlinking tank systems and through control over the allocation of water and ranked shares in the irrigated produce; this is an area where vestiges of Maravar caste power and warrior rule are to be found in the organization of the commons-tank and temple (Mosse 2003) .
From this line of research into relationships, power, meaning, and process, it was clear that irrigation tanks are multifaceted and socially embedded public institutions. Significantly, the way in which rights and relations around tanks were ritualized so as to legitimize the local social order found a parallel in the organization of worship at village and regional temples. It became clear to me that tanks, as well as the interests and strategic behavior around them, were about more than managing water. They were sources of symbolic, as well as material, resources-that is to say, they signaled status, rank, and honor (or subordination and servitude). As containers of symbolic resources, tanks and temple festivals are about kattupatu-order, control, community coordination, and social integration (see Rao 2005) , but such integration is always also a political act of rule at different levels (e.g., village, region), a claim to status or for political (perhaps electoral) support. To give the obvious return to Chwe's volley at Foucault, "publicity" is about power as much as coordination or "common knowledge" (Chwe 2001 ). 9 7 In Tamil, karai means clan/lineage, "a division of co-parcenary land in a village," border, and also the bund of a tank (Cologne Tamil online lexicon). 8 Dalit, a Marathi word meaning oppressed or downtrodden, is the term now most commonly used to refer to India's many subordinated and formerly "untouchable" castes. 9 The cultural construction of power, the kind of precolonial and colonial political integration involved in this Tamil plains region, and its significance in relation to the management of the tank water commons is the subject of research published elsewhere (e.g., Mosse 2003; see also Dirks 1987 ).
There is a further important point to be made. The ranked social relations that underpinned collective action in the Tamil plains area had never been independent of wider systems of state or bureaucracy (in precolonial, colonial, or contemporary times) that legitimized local authority and the allocation of productive resources. Rights to land and water were in the gift of kings, and shares in the harvested grain involved a hierarchy of rights, from ruler to cultivator, and a redistribution of resources notionally extracted by the state, which was overseen by state functionaries and negotiated with their collaborators and kinsmen among the village elite. Local authority continues to be underpinned by informal systems that redistribute public resources (e.g., public works budgets, auctioned tank resources), giving privileged control to village elites (as contractors), who then redistribute illegal profits upward to junior officials and politicians, as well as into temples through legitimizing acts of public religious gifting (Mosse 2003 ; see also Wade 1982) . In simple terms, successful collective action is embedded in wider systems of patronage and "corruption," as well as in village social hierarchies.
So, in relation to irrigation resources, if farmers are rational optimizers (and there is no suggestion that they are irrational), they have to optimize across all of the multiple social fields that constitute their lives, and the strategies and success in the game of irrigation are not only shaped by the immediate concerns of water or labor but also by strategies in other games, whether they concern acquisition of credit or inputs, maintaining status and honor, consolidating vertical links to the bureaucracy, achieving electoral success, or resisting caste dominance (Mosse 2003, 21) . To understand collective action (or its absence) around irrigation, it was necessary to understand the multifaceted nature of tanks as social and cultural systems.
The conception of tank institutions as equilibrium outcomes of competitive games between "appropriators" of the water commons then presented one set of problems to a historically minded anthropologist. The idea of institutions as "rules-in-use" overcoming free-rider problems (Ostrom 1990 ) presented another set. There were several reasons why it was impossible to understand cooperative water control in terms of the existence of effective "rules-in-use"-rules of access, apportionment, and sanctioning, among others. Despite appearances, cooperative water-use practices were not actually governed by a system of agreed-upon rules. The fact that often such rules are not followed is recognized in the literature that distinguishes "formal" from "working" rules (or rules from practical strategies; see, e.g., Hunt and Hunt [1976] ; Adams, Watson, and Mutiso [1997] ). The point is that rules are publicly expressed as official codes rather than privately followed as guides to behavior; they establish the way in which behavior is to be represented. Now, in these Tamil villages, men of influence had the symbolic capital of authority to deviate from the rule without attracting public notice or sanction (Bourdieu 1977) , for example, to divert scarce water to their dry-land chili cash crops in the name of protecting subsistence or to influence the actions of dependent water turners through threats or private incentives.
10 They could even underscore their own reputation through public displays upholding rules and enforcing sanctions on others-typically, more marginal players. Of course, some people's interests are better encoded in the rules than others to start with, although typically such privilege is concealed behind discourses that justify rights in terms of obligations, especially to the temple and village deity; that is, privileged shares in water are linked to shares of temple festival expenses. Typically, the interests of poorer, lower-caste, or tenant cultivators, and especially women, are weakly represented in formal rules regarding water and cropping priorities. Indeed, the structure of public discourse on water effectively mutes women and excludes their concerns (Mosse 2003, 201-2) .
As already noted, economists also emphasize the importance of transparency and mutual knowledge to rule enforcement within successful institutions of collective action. However, in the context of power asymmetries, information does not produce rule enforcement. In these villages, many people knew a good deal about the transgressions of others. Dalit-caste water turners, for example, had detailed knowledge of rule breaking, but they did not have the capacity to make this knowledge public. Or perhaps we should say that the cost of using the information would be high. In other words, whether and which knowledge becomes "common" (in Chwe's sense) is a matter of power. Public rituals are also public fictions.
I will make one final point on rule following. Esha Shah shows convincingly that, in tank systems in Karnataka, elites ensure that unequal systems of water allocation are built into physical designs (e.g., the layout of field channels or the selective neglect of structures), such that technology itself rather than incentives or authority is also important in ensuring rule adherence and inequity (Shah 2003) .
11 In short, for various reasons, in "cooperative" villages, publicly stated rules of water allocation did not govern behavior but were part of the means of articulating, legitimizing, and reproducing relations of power. If collective action around tank irrigation was about power and caste dominance as well as scarcity and risk, what was the significance of the lack of coordination of water use in the lower-catchment black-soil villages? What did the contrast with the upper-catchment villages reveal? From an institutional economic perspective, the answer was clear: the difference between the two types of village was that self-interested farmers were rationally constrained to follow public rules in one ecology and not in the other. But, from my perspective, an equally significant observation was that, in one set of villages, power and authority tended to be articulated through public institutionsfor example, irrigation systems, temples, and service roles that recollected Maravar warrior rule-while, in another set, power operated less publicly through diffuse private networks of patronage, alliance, and personal obligation, and public goods (e.g., water, fish, temple honors, public service) were not subject to ranked redistribution but instead were managed through contractual relations, independent provision, public auctions, waged labor, and the like. Now, the institutional economic account requires no further explanation. The answer to the question of why self-interested farmers cooperate is built into the cost-benefit model. But the answer to the question of why caste power does or does not articulate through public institutions of water control (and, correspondingly, of why "rational rituals" that allow coordination persist in some places and not in others) is more complicated; it has to do with ecology and history, or political economy. Let me explain.
There is evidence to suggest that, at around the end of the eighteenth century, lower-catchment black-soil villages were in fact characterized by the same caste-based public order and ritualized relations of water control around tanks as upper-catchment villages. These included low-caste service roles, rules and shares in water and grain, and associated ritual honors. Such relations were built into revenue and rule within the same decentralized state system. The historical question is, why were collective water management institutions (and their public rituals) eroded in this region while preserved in the other? Here ecological conditions are important. The black-soil areas of Ramnad and Sivaganga offered opportunities for agricultural expansion and new settlement that were not available in the upper-catchment red-soil areas. In the late eighteenth century, the population was swelled by agriculturalist castes such as Utaiyars, displaced by wars to the north, who acquired rights from Maravar rulers to clear and settle uncultivated land, where they grew dry-land crops (various kinds of millet). By the mid-to late nineteeth century, a British tax regime, together with privatized property rights and new markets, had given these cultivators unprecedented opportunities for accumulation. Economic wealth from agricultural production (especially of cash crops) was becoming more important as compared to political power exercised by Maravar headmen through the control of redistribution (i.e., the grain share-based revenue system) linked to higher levels of the kingly state.
In effect, social and economic change in the nineteeth century eroded the established order and its public institutions of common property, substituting privatized control over water (e.g., private tanks and sluices and private nirappacci servants) and land-based forms of authority. The erosion of institutions of water control in lower-catchment villages is part of a story of changing agrarian relations and systems of state that can be traced in some detail. This history and ecology has produced conditions-a contested structure of caste power, a dispersal of landed interests beyond tank wet land, intensified and diversified rainfed cropping (making demands on the tank water), complex land-tenure arrangements, or "opting out" through pump technology-that have long militated against sustaining collective action for tank water management. In lower-catchment villages, as a matter of experience and expectation, there is no cooperation, no public order, no rules, "no control," no kattupatu.
By contrast, in the upper-catchment villages, ecological constraints have ensured a remarkable continuity of paddy cultivation under tanks over a 200-year period. For sure, the population has increased, paddy cultivation has intensified, and irrigation commands have expanded, but the options have been limited, and benefits from new agricultural technologies or new cash crop markets have been marginal. Agricultural continuity has played a part in allowing continuity of authoritative control over wet-land rice production and redistribution, even though the way in which local authority has been integrated into wider political systems of state has changed dramatically over 2 centuries (see Mosse 2003) . This authority has been expressed in culturally specific conceptions of rule and service in the village public domain (ur potu), which have, in turn, given tank resources their symbolic significance in the articulation of hierarchical social relations. Kattupatu (order, control, cooperation) is historical and cultural, not simply the result of an internal structure of economic incentives among communities of irrigation users. Finally, as I have explained elsewhere (Mosse 2003, 234-38) , the conceptualization of contrasted "regions of collective action" has vernacular expression, too, in the distinction between manakalanatu (sandy-soil [manal] and wetland rice [natu] ) and karicalkkatu (black cotton soil [karical man] and dry land [katu]), which are not only opposed ecological zones but also social types.
IV. So What? Outcomes and Processes
At this point, however, an economist might still ask, what extra explanatory power has all this additional social and cultural information actually contributed? What is its relevance?
12 Do caste power or public ritual independently generate collective action around commons resources? Can we isolate caste relations or the symbolic power of tank systems and correlate them with collective action? These are not unreasonable questions, but they miss the point of the argument and the evidence, which is that the variables are not independent: social relations are expressed through ecological constraints, and ecological constraints are expressed through social structure. 13 If you conclude that risk and scarcity provide incentives for cooperation, you can just as well say that risk and scarcity ensure that relations of power are expressed and legitimized through systems for the control of commons resources that are scarce. In other words, scarcity and risk produce collective action by sustaining hierarchical systems of control as much as through effects on the structure of individual incentives. Moreover, it is such structures of power, rather than scarcity itself, that determine how and whether Chwe's public rituals that factiliate coordination are mounted.
From the point of view of outcomes, however, my historical and anthropological research still has not explained anything extra: collective action is determined by ecological conditions of scarcity and risk. But we now know a lot more about how outcomes are produced, about the social and historical processes involved. Is this important? Does it matter that the mesoscale patterns that reveal an association between risk, scarcity, and collective action do not explain the social dynamics involved; or that the institutional economic mechanisms imputed (incentive structures bearing on individual material maximizers) invoke a type of simplified agent that does not populate south Indian 12 As Robert Wade put it, it is like asking: what is the relevance to understanding the content of Foucault's central arguments of the true fact that he was bald (personal communication)? 13 Indeed, most collective action variables are mediated by other interacting variables, which is what makes common properties so unyielding to economic causal modeling (Agrawal, forthcoming) . This is not to say that ecologically determined risk and scarcity cannot influence cooperation without strong institutions of caste power. It is true, e.g., that, in 26% of the upper-catchment villages studied, irrigation institutions existed and nirppaccis were supported in the absence of authoritative relations of Maravar caste dominance. These are smaller single-caste (Pallar, Nadar or Konar) villages where nirppaccis were not hierarchically integrated Dalit service roles. However, as a matter of social and historical fact, in the majority of cases, tank management was embedded in hierarchical caste relations, as indeed was the case in lower-catchment villages in the past.
villages?
14 When trying to explain broad patterns in the distribution of collective action, perhaps it does not matter, and economic models derive their power from the ability to generalize outward across a population. But when trying to generalize "downward" to practice, it matters a great deal. It is here that institutional economic models have a specific weakness and where they have been far less successful. The problem is that, because they offer general explanations, economists' models are attractive to policy makers, and even more so because they are understood to be predictive (to describe the conditions necessary for collective action); but they are not predictive. Generalizing to practice from outcomes is precisely where problems arise and where anthropological attention to social process and complex agency is critical. To explain this, I will look at ways in which economic models fail to predict practice, first, in the context of existing community institutions, and, second, when promoting new or modified ones through resources management transfer or community-driven development.
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A. Prediction and Process
There are several ways in which the models arising from an institutionalist analysis of outcomes in terms of incentives, rules, or institutional arrangements are inadequate or simply wrong, and the pursuit of them would be ineffective or misguided. Correspondingly, the things about common-property systems discovered through historical-anthropological research but concealed from economic analysis turn out to be crucial to understanding practice. Let me illustrate with reference to the present case.
First, while the institutionalist literature has promoted the view that effective collective action in resource management is associated with the presence of organizations or associations providing assurances or enforcing rules (hence, their widespread promotion in CBNRM [community-based natural resource management] programs), in our upper-catchment cooperative villages, orga-14 Of course, economists recognize the importance of institutions and factor them into the equations of individual rational choice. Institutions are mechanisms to coordinate decision making, reduce uncertainty about others' actions, and build in assurances (by ensuring that the costs of breaking rules are greater than the benefits of free riding). Moreover, game-theoretical modeling has begun to take account of ethics, norms, expectations, "common knowledge," and other forms of assurance, trust, or habit that influence or sustain cooperative solutions and the institutions that these involve (Runge 1986; Seabright 1993; Chwe 2001) . 15 Ray (in this issue) and Sengupta (forthcoming, 6) both point to the inability of game theory models explaining collective action to provide guides for action in fostering new institutions and to the tendency, therefore, for programs to be designed by sociologists (i.e., where programs are "participatory" and not solely designed by engineers). As Sengupta (forthcoming) notes: "Economists direct their energy to finding equilibrium. They have little to say about the way to the equilibrium." nizations were absent and resisted. 16 Here collective action did not take corporate form (pace Wade 1987) . Only one of the 57 villages studied had any recognizable "council" or association. Second, and related, income from commons resources was rarely reinvested in them but rather was used to underpin local authority. So money earned from the sale of fish or trees, fines or fees, or other contracts was rarely managed as a common fund or invested in tank maintenance. Instead, common funds were rapidly expended for religious purposes: on temple repair, festivals, or other rituals. These common resources were not primarily managed in ways that maximized economic utility and ensured accountability but instead in ways that minimized social conflict and served to enhance the prestige and credibility of existing leadership and to secure their upward political connections (Mosse 2003, 173) . However, where structures of authority were weaker, and where public institutions were attenuated by conflict or social diversity (as in many lower-catchment villages), the moral claims on such resources were weaker; here common funds were not used to support social hierarchy and were more likely to be reinvested in the irrigation system. 17 The lack of corporate organization or the absence of reinvestment of resources into the commons where scarcity is high and collective action is strong could not have been predicted by institutional economic models (quite the reverse). Rather, these features of the irrigation system arise from the sociocultural position of tanks in southern Tamil Nadu as part of a public domain to be ruled rather than a resource to be managed. This gives all tank resources-rights to water or fish shares, the use of common money, or service roles-a symbolic significance as idioms of social standing and political power; in consequence, this makes them a focus of dispute (or political strategy) out of proportion to their material value, which may be no more than a handful of fish.
Third, where water systems are embedded in authoritarian structures of caste, they will be subject to the effects of social and political changes that challenge such power and undermine the "naturalness" of caste-class privilege (Gupta 1998) . Despite a remarkable continuity of economic and political dominance in upper-caste-controlled villages, many are now subject to the dynamics of a (still-contained) politics of protest and Dalit resistance to the social subordination manifested in their ascribed roles in tank and temple. These processes have seriously disrupted water distribution in nearly half of the upper-catchment villages surveyed. Claims to symbolic resources, such as temple honors, have gone along with demands to renegotiate water rights and roles to make them less caste specific, more contractual, and better paid.
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The conflict over symbolic resources in "cooperative" Vayalur had a significant impact on irrigation. For 3 years the village tanks lacked an effective water distribution system, and in Citanaru (another upper-catchment village), when nirpaccis withdrew services, farmers began to assert de facto individual control over water, leaving sluices open, impounding water in their fields immediately below the tank, and using it to irrigate adjacent land. Water wastage, inequity, and serious crop losses resulted from the absence of water distributors. Here the political logic of public rituals worked against coordination and economic rationality. But it is significant that, in contrast to lower-catchment villages, the strong economic need for nirppaccis here often resulted in their eventual reconstitution on terms that gave greater respect to these Dalit services. Sometimes new arrangements have been put in place, although the complex and time-consuming procedures they involve (with chits and supervisory systems) demonstrate the costs of eroding authoritative caste structures. In many places across Tamil Nadu, however, water distribution systems have become moribund, renegotiated, if at all, through the mediation of external agencies committed to RMT/CDD, promoting participatory irrigation and willing to invest in water-user's associations (WUAs).
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B. Promoting Collective Action
I think it is fair to conclude that the application of institutional economic models without reference to the sociopolitical specifics of collective action around tank systems in Tamil Nadu would provide a very poor guide to action or to understanding for development agencies (state or NGO [nongovernmental organizations]) mandated to promote farmer-controlled irrigation organizations under currently fashionable programs of irrigation management transfer (IMT) or participatory irrigation management (PIM). I have reviewed the experience of PIM in Tamil Nadu elsewhere (Mosse 2003, 266ff.) , but it is worth recalling the several ways in which evidence from case studies of WUA processes in Tamil villages demonstrate the salience of ethnographic analysis.
During the 1980s and 1990s, major investments in "tank rehabilitation" were made under a European Union-funded program, within which the Centre for Water Resources (CWR) of Anna University piloted the promotion of WUAs taking engineering contracts and managing the developed irrigation systems. These interventions were monitored carefully through the work of village-level "process documentators." 20 While development agencies assumed that they could relatively easily promote WUAs on the grounds that there were clear economic benefits to be gained from improved works and greater efficiency in tank management, village case studies show again and again how agency staff quickly found themselves amid complex village and caste conflicts because of the unanticipated public and political nature of irrigation institutions.
First, in several cases, the "traditional local institutions" (e.g., those based on the share and lineage systems mentioned earlier) upon which agency staff expected to build new organizations were subject to intense dispute, as Dalit cultivators challenged caste-based exclusion from equal rights to scarce water, or these institutions had recently been disbanded entirely. Conflicts over water rights were inseparable from other conflicts over common property, temple honors, or obligations of service. Interventions to promote new WUAs in these circumstances amplified caste and factional conflict as various players (faction leaders or caste groups) attempted to advance particular agendas by shaping the new institutions in terms of their interests.
In Nallaneri village (Chengalpattu), upper-caste Mudaliars tried to reassert caste dominance by organizing the new WUA around the old "share" system that ensured privileged access to material and symbolic resources (Mosse 2003, 276-79) . In Kannangudi village (Pudukkottai), upper-caste Vellalars and Kallars ensured that the process of enrollment and recruitment of office bearers and the executive committee (EC) of the new WUA was structured by the old system of ranked rights, or karai, which reproduced their dominance within the new institution. In both villages, Dalits refused these ranked forms of social integration and collective action, and they bargained the terms of their participation in the new associations, winning concessions such as EC representation and office bearing, without conceding the right to bargain wages as the principal laborers for community projects. From the start, these WUAs were at the center of a local caste politics that was sharpened by broader political trends of the 1990s. The fact that these were public institutions linked to external authority and to financial, political, and symbolic resources only intensified the caste and factional conflict focused on the WUAs, which were rarely confined to water or the material resources of tanks.
These experiences are a long way from the notion of irrigation management 20 The CWR program was supported by the Ford Foundation.
transfer as the stabilizing of village groups around rules of resources use crafted by communities of "appropriators" bound together by the individual economic benefits of cooperative management of shared resources (Ostrom 1990 ). Rather, PIM implies intensified competition over resources and disputes over social position and authority. Moreover, whereas collective-action institutions arising from PIM policies are represented and theorized as spontaneous and selfsupporting, in reality they are mostly introduced and sustained by substantial external resources and authority (government, NGOs). In the short term, WUAs depend upon expensive processes of mobilization, training, and negotiation, but their long-term survival is dependent upon reforms in the wider framework of irrigation administration and its system of incentives, which continue to meet unyielding political/institutional resistance and from which a focus on community institutions presently diverts attention (see Mosse 2003, 287ff.) .
V. Social Capital: A New Framework for Understanding Collective Action?
Despite such experiences, within development policy circles, the dominance of economic thought, models, and research is unchallenged. The presence of anthropologists may have increased in development agencies along with the new social development goals of participation, community-driven development, empowerment, and local governance, but the influence of contextual ethnographic research has not. Human behavior is still more likely to be discussed by reasoning back from econometric regressions or equilibrium models than forward from culturally grounded ethnographic description. Those whose task it has been to advance the social development agenda within large development agencies (none more so than in the World Bank) have had to find ways to theorize "the social" that is missing from conventional economists' models in terms that allow generalization, prediction, and policy relevance and that follow economics reasoning (Bebbington et al. 2004 ). Currently, the most influential framework within which this has been attempted is that of "social capital," which some claim allows the combination of economists' capacity to identify central trends and general patterns through regressions while retaining the anthropologists' concern with social relationships and networks (i.e., without the need for methodological individualism). Taking social capital thinking in the World Bank as a case, in the following sections, I want, first, to set out, in the briefest way, the kind of theory or framework of social capital that is used to explain, predict, and produce collective action, and, second, to examine some of the key social capital propositions regarding collective action in the light of the Tamil village evidence.
A. The Social Capital Idea
The idea of social capital that has acquired ascendancy in policy circles, especially within the World Bank, and the one with which I am concerned here, derives from Robert Putnam's thesis that "networks of civic engagement" give rise to social capital, meaning "features of social organization such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1993, 35-36) . Often summarized as the norms and networks that enable collective action, social capital has become a bundle of ideas about the causes and consequences of social interaction and their outcomes such as collective action. To understand this bundle, it is important to realize that, like "community," social capital is both the raw material and a goal of development (see Robertson 1984) ; it is a public good to be created or protected.
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In the years since Putnam's Making Democracy Work, the concept has been complicated and differentiated, partly in response to critique, although it still evades conceptual precision.
22 Among other things, this expansion and dif-21 "Social capital is an ingredient of CDD"; "CDD aims to mobilize a stock of social capital effectively, to invest in social mobility and capacity building, and new forms of social capital": these are not uncommon comments heard at the World Bank in Washington, DC. 22 In response to the criticism that Putnam's formulation did not clearly separate the close ingroup ties of clan or caste from the sort of multiple weak ties he believed correlated with effective government, the distinction between social capital as "bonding" or "bridging" was introduced Narayan 2002; see also Putnam 2000) . When it was pointed out that organizational capacities identified as "social capital" are not independent of "vertical" connections across power differentials to wider institutions of the state or market (bureaucracies, political parties, banks, etc.), the notion of "linking social capital" was added (Woolcock [1999] , cited in Grootaert et al. [2003] ). (Given that "linkage" across power often involves patronage and strong networks of dependency and oppression into which poor people are tied, one might also speak of "binding" social capital.) Since, it was obvious that some forms of social capital (e.g., nepotism, insider trading, and political favoritism) had deleterious social effects, it was necessary to distinguish "positive" from "negative" social capital (Grootaert et al. 2003, 7) . Social capital should also, some argued, include "the social and political environment that shapes social structure and enables norms to develop," thus extending social capital "to the most formalised institutional relationships and structures such as government, the political regime, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties" (http:// www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm). This introduced a distinction between government social capital and civil social capital (the latter referring to interactions not directly dependent on government rules and systems or on intra-household relations-yet another type of social capital [Collier 2002] ). In recent writing, World Bank staff have tried to bring this unruly differentiation and expansion of the concept to order in definitions that distinguish social capital into six components: (i) groups and networks; (ii) trust, adherence norms, and solidarity (also distinguished as "structural" and "cognitive" social capital (Grootaert et al. [2003] , citing Krishna and Uphoff [2002] ); (iii) collective action and cooperation; (iv) information and communication; (v) social cohesion and inclusion; and (vi) empowerment and political action (e.g., Grootaert et al. 2003) . The latter component is no doubt partly intended to respond to the broad criticism that the social capital concept adopted by policy makers provides a depoliticized and conservative view of social relations, contrasted with the use of the term by sociologists such as Bourdieu to explore the way ferentiation suggests that the concept of social capital remains dependent upon, and derivative of, other forms of social analysis. In practice, however, the conceptual specification of the term has largely been linked to a highly influential body of econometric work, initially inspired by Putnam's work on the correlation between civic engagement and governance. The production of empirical evidence provided a powerful accelerator of the social capital concept, certainly in the World Bank. Using a variety of proxy indicators-membership of groups, networks, and associations; trust of neighbors or service providersa growing number of studies in a wide range of countries related social capital to outcome variables such as income, access to credit and services, trade, political engagement, collective action, the absence of violence and crime, and project effectiveness (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Narayan and Cassidy 2001; Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002) .
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These studies have bequeathed to social capital some serious methodological and conceptual difficulties, 24 which I have to pass over here in order to get to the core social capital idea relevant for the present discussion of collective action, which is that the capacity to cooperate (and overcome free-rider and coordination problems) is itself a (by-) product of social interactions (Collier 2002) . 25 Social capital is the set of durable interactions that result in coordination capacities-either spontaneously because of generated trust or through the conscious decisions of organizations that bring about interaction and generate trust-and establish rules and allocative decisions (Collier 2002, 31) . However, it is not at all clear that this idea of social capital provides any explanation of the variation in levels of collective action among our Tamil villages. For it to do so, we would have to accept that villages with different degrees of effective collective action (around water) varied either in terms of in which culture is contested and deployed to create stratification in society (Fine 1999; Harriss 2001; Mosse 2005b) . 23 In the World Bank, considerable effort has gone into developing instruments to measure and quantify social capital (in its different forms) within larger household surveys such as the nationallevel Living Standards Measurement Survey (Grootaert et al. 2003) . 24 Perhaps most obvious is the question of whether social capital (the combination of trust, membership of associations, etc.) composes a "class of asset endowment" of a household that can be aggregated at the local, regional, or national level and whose returns on well-being can be measured and aggregated so as to influence investment decisions (e.g., by comparing returns to investment in human or physical capital [Grootaert et al. 2003, 21]) . What is at issue are not only serious questions concerning the framing of social capital questionnaires, or the uncertain causal processes that might explain regressions (Harriss 2001, 91) , but also an irredeemable vagueness about what constitutes a social influence on individual behavior. Durlauf (2002) suggests that this is a question that is better addressed through social psychology of descriptive histories than by econometric analysis. 25 Social capital is the "information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in . . . social networks" (Woolcock 1998, 153) . trust derived from social interaction or in terms of the presence of organizations or the intensity of associational life. The first is implausible, and the second is contradicted by the evidence (see below). If conceptualization about how social capital has its effects is weak, the analysis of how social capital is caused is vaguer still. Studies designed to identify the effects of social capital on social and economic outcomes treat social capital as an independent rather than a dependent variable; that is, they do not ask how social capital comes about or what determines its creation (Grootaert et al. 2003, 24) . Social capital theory has little to say on this beyond Putnam's path dependency.
Nonetheless, social capital is an important part of current strategies for decentralized resource management, community-driven development, improved governance, and other projects of the World Bank and other aid agencies. The general reasoning is that, if levels of engagement in civil society are raised (shown by improved input indicators such as membership of associations), this will lead to improved coordination (evident in the outputs of trust and collective action) and ultimately to increased levels of accountability and democracy. It is this relationship between associational life, collective action, and democracy that can also be subject to ethnographic investigation.
My point is that descriptive history suggests that the causal relationship between associational life and collective action does not, in fact, hold in the case of the tank irrigation commons we have been discussing. Strong collective action in water management (in upper-catchment villages) is not linked to vibrant associational life or the presence of organizations; nor is the absence or decline of cooperation (in the lower-catchment villages) associated with the absence of "structural" social capital in this sense. Moreover, associations do not appear to promote democratic processes so much as to be their consequence, and these same democratic processes tend to erode existing forms of collective action in commons management. This all amounts to dangerous terrain for predictive models for CDD-type interventions.
B. Associational Life and Collective Action on the Tamil Plains
In relation to cooperative irrigation management in the upper-catchment villages, I want to make four points. First, as explained earlier, collective action around tank irrigation is not dependent upon trust generated through interactions and associations but is founded upon relations of caste power, graded authority, personal patronage, and the redistribution of resources (as bribes and payoffs). Second, as I have already pointed out, the persistence of coordination around common-resource management here does not depend upon the existence of organizations or associations. On the contrary, organizations (regular meetings, standing funds, etc.) are avoided on account of the trans-action costs and the risk of conflict they entail, and their existence usually signals the failure of authority in one way or another.
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Third, where coordination is embedded in relations of social rank and control, the formation of independent associations is actively suppressed. Subordinate groups within hierarchical systems are often fearful of forming associations to promote their interests. When, for example, the Dalits of Kannangudi village (mentioned above) were eventually persuaded by an NGO to form a men's association and a women's association, they considered it expedient to invite a man and a woman from the dominant Kallar caste to take the positions of the societies' presidents, "with the aim of giving honor to the upper caste people."
27 Local history shows that, in many Tamil villages, the formation of clubs or groups with a public profile-for sports or religious purposes-by certain categories of people can be regarded as provocative insubordination, as political acts provoking violent reactions by dominant castes.
Finally, when in "cooperative" villages like Vayalur new associations (such as water-users' associations) were formed by external agencies to promote cooperation, either they remained moribund or existing power structures were reproduced within them. So, contrary to social capital thinking, in the specific context of strong collective action around commons resources in these Tamil villages, the persistence of coordination is not linked to persisting organizations; nor would we expect it to correlate with trust or accountability as functions of the intensity of social interaction.
C. The Historical Decline of Village Collective Action and the Rise of Associations
What about the contrasting case? Are noncooperative villages in the lower catchment characterized by poverty in associational life? In fact, the contrary is the case. Where collective action around the management of irrigation and other commons resources is weak, associationalism abounds. Indeed, if we look at the issue historically (taking the case of lower-catchment village Alapuram), a certain rise in associationalism can be directly linked to the decline of coordinated control of commons resources.
Earlier in this article, I described how the growing landed wealth of rainfed cash-crop cultivators in the nineteenth century weakened Maravar-controlled hierarchical systems of public order and common property. Challenges to the old public order involved new forms of caste association initially formed in the context of conflicts over festival honors at regional shrines through which in-migrant cultivators sought to turn growing economic power into durable caste rights and public honor. During the twentieth century, low castes (Dalits) in Alapuram and other lower-catchment villages, who had acquired economic independence through migrant labor, employment, and land acquisition, used an identical strategy, building new informal supravillage networks and castebased associations further to erode coordination based on hierarchical integration (Mosse 1994) . 28 Here, once again, the political logic of public rituals that enhance "common knowledge" (about status ambitions) militates against coordination of economic activities (Chwe 2001) .
In the 1990s, a plethora of associations-of Dalits, youth, and womenwere organizing action around village common properties in Alapuram village. Common properties such as tanks were strategic sites in several ways: first, members of low castes (and women) laid claim to these material and symbolic resources as a challenge to upper-caste landlords and contractors; second, because these commons constituted government property (purumpokkui, Public Works Department [PWD]), action over them could invoke support from the state (PWD, revenue, or police) for claims to equal access as citizens in face of upper-caste exclusions; and, third, by organizing action on tank repair or water supply, politically ambitious individuals could appeal to common interests and so mobilize the broader constituencies of support that electoral politics demanded.
One conclusion to draw from this scenario is that a simultaneous weakening of hierarchical orders of community collective action and the rise of associationalism (and struggles for autonomy) has characterized the shifting politics of this locality from the mid-nineteenth century. Any discussion of social capital, associationalism, and collective action in the region has to be set in this context. Second, it is important to ask who organizes and associates. Significantly, it is the low castes (Dalits), youth, and women for whom new associations are important and necessary in making claims to resources, asserting rights, or getting support from the state (see Mosse 2005a, 213-15) . Typically, more powerful groups do not need to associate in this way to get access to resources or to secure support from the bureaucracy. They rely on informal networks to influence state officials, to broker deals, or to win contracts. When Arulananda, a Dalit man is caught pumping tank water to his dry lands from inside the tank, an influential upper-caste man simply reports the matter to the VAO (village administrative officer), who goes with the village watchman to stop his engine. But when Arulananda understands that, in the same night, upper-caste farmers (the Maravar "president" and his kinsmen) have also been illegally irrigating their cash-crop chilies, he organizes a protest and presents a signed petition to the tahsildar (senior-most subdistrict official).
A third point challenges assumptions linking associationalism (or social capital) with accountability and processes of democratic governance. These associations of the weak do not always seek democratic accountability or transparency from the institutions of government. Rather they petition for authoritative interventions (from the bureaucracy, NGOs, church, or party) in support of specific claims, in local conflicts, or for protection against injustice from powerful individuals in the village. Their concern is not primarily with democratic processes (the pathways to decision making). Indeed, associations may use nondemocratic means and seek to manipulate an existing personalized order of hierarchy and patronage by appealing to influential persons-tahsildar, district collector, or politician-perhaps to impose on subordinate officers. In water-users' associations, too, mobilization for special pleading and vertical appeals undermines the consolidation of authoritative group decision making. 29 Now, the presence of associations among Dalits (or women), self-formed or fostered by NGOs, Dalit movements, political parties, or state agencies, does not make these groups richer than upper-caste men in social capital as a community or household asset. If anything, associations result from the experience of the ineffectiveness of Dalits' existing networks to access services or symbolic resources. Dalits and upper castes may be equally rich or poor in a measure of household social capital, but, as Harriss (2001) points out, it is not the density of networks but rather their power and reach that matters. When there was conflict over the control of the new water-users' association in the village of Nallaneri, Dalits appealed to local bureaucrats and relied upon support from an NGO working in their hamlet (this was the extent of their "linking social capital"), but the upper-caste Mudaliar faction trying to control the WUA mobilized huge resources for litigation in the dispute and their networks were such that their claims and interests came to be argued for in the chambers of the PWD Secretary in Madras. These accounts show how problematic it is to try to isolate social capital as a form of productive asset from assets of other kinds upon which it depends. It is hard to imagine what it would mean to find, for example, that "social capital is much more equally distributed than physical assets and human capital," as Grootaert and Narayan (2000) do for Bolivia (cited in Grootaert et al. [2003, 23] ).
In general, a measure of social capital that lifts social relations out of their specific political-economic context for the purposes of quantification cannot avoid flattening out or aggregating unlike things. Moreover, associations have their own history. They come into existence at particular moments in particular ways for specific reasons, perhaps as part of an ongoing struggle. Of course, this also means that conflicts that are provoked by associations at one period of social transition may be resolved by them at another or in the longer term and that in some circumstances certain associations may indeed strengthen collective action around common property. A single-moment survey cannot help but produce a statistical artifact that freezes a dynamic set of relations and permits confused causality or that quantifies social connections in ways that misrepresent their significance (see Harriss 2001) .
VI. Democratic Politics, Associations, and Collective Action
There is one final point that I want to make, and this concerns the relationship between collective action, associational activity, and the processes of democratic politics. The social capital policy narrative set in motion by Putnam's (1993) Italian study assumes that vibrant associations not only produce effective community collective action but also foster democratic processes. I have already suggested that associationalism may be compatible with personalized hierarchical modes of decision making and intervention. It also seems likely that the causal relation is often not from associations to democratic processes but the reverse. In Alapuram, as presumably in a great many Indian villages, the principles and processes of democracy have had a profound effect on collective action and civil association. Alapuram would well illustrate points made by Rudolph (2000) from village studies in northern India, namely, that, on the one hand, electoral competition brings a new associationalism into being, increasingly drawn around the politics of caste and religious identity and increasingly militant, and, on the other hand, "the establishment of democratic institutions at the local level, and [the] channelising of development funds and programmes through these, have set in motion processes that tend to deplete-rather than enhance-the pre-existing social capital" (Rudolph [2000 (Rudolph [ , 1764 , citing Jayal [1999, 8-9] ).
In rural India, it would be harder to argue that the social capital of associationalism has produced democratic processes (as Putnam did) than that a particular form of democratic process, including electoral competition and party activity, has generated new forms of association while at the same time disrupting existing forms of community collective action (Rudolph 2000 (Rudolph , 1764 . Political parties have often proved to be powerful promoters of social networks. As Jenkins (2001, 259) notes, "to assert that political parties can and ought to remain distinct from the social groups it is their function to reconcile is to assign them a role of dispassionate interest aggregators, shorn of ideology and immune to the pressures of power. There is little empirical justification for such a view." Certainly, during the 1980s and 1990s, electoral processes at different levels in rural Tamil Nadu and the growing importance of identity politics (around caste if not religion) provided the context for further associational activity while weakening older forms of collective action around the commons.
Moreover, as caste and religious identity become more and more central to the wider practices of politics, influencing the terms in which interests are expressed, this begins to appear at the village level in the forms of associations that emerge and the way in which claims to resources are made. So, when Alapuram Dalits write a petition to the tahsildar complaining about uppercaste farmers diverting tank water to dry-land cash crops, they do so in the arresting language of the threat of "caste problems" (cati piraccinai). Or, when the PWD Secretary, chief engineer, district collector, and other officials are telegrammed in the context of a WUA dispute, it is in the language of a threat of "communal riot." And when four jeeps arrive in the village with police and senior revenue officials and a public meeting is organized to resolve matters, the power of both common property and the discourse of communal identity to evoke a rapid response and bring the state-as a bureaucratic machine of law, order, and justice-into village affairs is clear. In this way, local associationalism intersects with a wider politics of identity in a manner that is mutually enforcing.
VII. Conclusions
This article has involved a conversation between anthropological and economist perspectives on collective action. Important challenges have been posed for anthropology. In particular, how are larger patterns or variations in social outcomes to be explained, how are the effects of different variables to be isolated, and how do observations relate to more general theory? Historical and ethnographic data have, in turn, offered their own view on the interacting variables and the complex and dynamic "causal patterns" involved (Agrawal, forthcoming) . Here the question of collective action and the commons is placed within a broader framework of ecological history, governance, and political and economic change that is largely missing from economics frameworks, even those now turning attention to public rituals or symbolic goods as mechanisms of coordination.
The attempt to synthesize the social and the economic in a theory of "social capital" poses questions about the relationship between norms, networks, associations, and collective action. But this also introduces unresolved problems: too many different social phenomena are bundled together, and the statistical concept of social capital is unable to grasp the historical dynamic between collective action, associations, and democratic practice. As theory, social capital is too vague about the mechanisms by which social interaction produces values or collective action, and as policy its causal relations are too unidirectional (from associations to collective action or democratic process) to be useful.
Unlike anthropological-historical analyses, economists' models have generalizing and predictive power. They are, in consequence, far more compatible with the policy thinking of governments, donors, and multilateral agencies than the analytical descriptions of anthropologists, whose capacity to generalize or to conceptualize the future is limited (see Appadurai 2004) . The strong presence of economic thinking in the centers of policy and power has encouraged the critical observation that economistic models (including social capital) are useful because they are consistent with certain policy priorities in a normative or ideological sense. Thus, game-theoretic models represent community irrigation institutions as internally generated-the equilibrium outcome of structures of incentives-in ways that support neoliberal policies to devolve responsibilities to users, while the emphasis on behavioral change in the community also serves to divert attention away from wider issues of property rights and state policy (Mosse 1999; 2003, 273-76) .
World Bank social capital models have been criticized on similar grounds (Fine 1999; Harriss 2001) . The concept of social capital is not only accused of encouraging a depoliticized analysis of power relations and social institutions leading to conservative system-sustaining interventions but also of foreclosing the engagement of policy with critical social science (Fine 1999; Harriss 2001) . Certainly, the self-history of social capital thinking at the World Bank reveals a series of concessions by anthropologists to economists' epistemology and methodology (Bebbington et al. 2004 ). Indeed, this social capital discourse reveals the structural marginality of a noneconomist professional group constantly having to persuade those with power (task managers, vice presidents, and regional budget holders) that social relations are important to development (Mosse 2004) . The persistent efforts, the strategic collaborations, the compromises, and the publicity (the many inches of Web site devoted to social capital) are indicators of political weakness and the struggle to achieve respectability for ideas that still command little support internally and have little operational significance. Social capital may, then, in the end, be interesting not for its power to depoliticize the social world but for what it reveals of the structure of unequal power within which conversations between economists and anthropologists have to take place in development institutions. Finally, lest anthropologists succumb to the illusion that power is always located elsewhere and never in one's own domain (Eyben 2003) , it is well to recall that, of course, anthropology has its own dubious connections with systems of rule (especially colonial ones). With the turn to community-driven development and the hidden work of anthropologists in shaping these new ventures, the "ethnographic state" (Dirks 2001, 43) may not yet be dead (Tania Li, personal communication) .
